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I. INTRODUCTION
T O THE ORDINARY traveler, the Wright Amendment ap-
pears to be an antiquated law hindering competition and
artificially boosting air fares in the Dallas-Fort Worth Me-
troplex.' Without this law, airlines would be able to fly to any
destination of their choice from an airport in the heart of this
major city.2 Southwest Airlines worked hard to bias the public
on the inequity of this restriction.3 By organizing petitions, lob-
bying Congress, and designing an aggressive media campaign,
the airline became heavily invested in solving an alleged prob-
lem that affects only one relatively small airport seven miles
from downtown Dallas.4 In reality, the limitation codifies years
of aggressive litigation between several parties resolved equitably
by a federal law, which, in actuality, fosters competition on a
level playing field.5 Although the restriction addressed only one
small airport, it continues to have lasting effects on the entire
state.6 Changes to the amendment could not only affect service
to many rural destinations, but could also significantly affect ser-
vice at other large airports.7 This law is about much more than
I See Sw. Airlines Co., The Wright Amendment-Repeal the Restrictions on Dal-
las Love Airport, http://www.setlovefree.com (last visitedJan. 7, 2007) [hereinaf-
ter Repeal the Restrictions on Dallas Love Field] (using these arguments to
further influence the opinion of the average traveler).
2 See id. (arguing the side for repeal and the benefits which would result).
3 See id. (illustrating Southwest's motivation behind ending restrictions on
their home airport).
4 Sw. Airlines Co., Dallas City and Airport Information, http://www.southwest.
com/cities/dal.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
5 See infra Part IV.C.
6 See Todd Gillman, Smaller Cities Back Wright Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
10, 2006, at D2 (reporting on the statewide impact on other cities affected by an
attack on the Wright Amendment).
7 See generally ECLAT CONSULTING, REPEALING THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT-RISKS
FACING SMALL COMMUNITIES AND THE DALLAS METROPLEX 22-24 (2005), available
at http://www.eclatconsulting.com/ppt.pdf/wright-complete.pdf (showing the
route differences between Hobby Airport and Love Field). As Dallas Love Field is
restricted through the Wright Amendment, many passengers "double ticket"
through other cities. See id. As Houston Hobby is one of the largest operations in
the region for Southwest, it is likely that Dallas traffic through Hobby would de-
crease as a result of an open Dallas market. See id.; see also KEVIN L. FREIBERG &
JACQUELYN A. FREIBERG, NUTS!: SOUTHWEST AIRLINES' CRAzY RECIPE FOR BUSINESS
AND PERSONAL SUCCESS 26 (1996) (detailing the original airline plan to alleviate
the bind on Dallas Love by unofficially connecting passengers through Hobby).
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the "Freedom to Fly."' It stems from decades of city rivalry, legal
battles, and a powerful drive to gain a competitive edge.9
Although Southwest Airlines is headquartered in Dallas, a fed-
eral restriction typically referred to as the "Wright Amendment"
forbids Dallas Love Field Airport service to a vast majority of des-
tinations served by Southwest Airlines.' 0 The twenty-six year old
Wright Amendment emerged from a long-lasting battle over air-
field service in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex."1 In an effort
to calm this fury, Southwest remained silent on the issue of the
amendment's repeal for over twenty years; however, the airline
began a campaign at the end of 2004 to "Set Love Free."'
' 2
When Congress deregulated the airline industry in 1978, it
ended a long standing federal policy of ensuring "sound devel-
opment of an air transportation system."' 3  The year 1978
marked a drastic shift. No longer would the government regu-
late where an airline could fly or how much it could charge for
that service.14 Although almost every airline suffered major
losses as a consequence of deregulation, Congress let market
forces prevail.' 5 Even when the U.S. flag carrier, Pan American
Airlines, suffered bankruptcy at the hands of deregulation, the
government did nothing.16 After the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA), Congress exercised its commerce regulatory powers in
1979 to pass the Wright Amendment.' 7 Contrary to the federal
8 See Sw. Airlines Co., Advertising, http://www.southwest.com/images/
ad-gallery/30th-trdmrk.ad.jpg (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
9 See infra Parts II-III.
10 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980) (the Wright Amendment).
11 See, e.g., STANLEY H. Sco-r & LEVI H. DAVIS, A GIANT IN TEXAS: A HISTORY OF
THE DALLAS-FORT WORTH REGIONAL AiRPORT CONTROVERSY, 1911-1974 5-15
(1974) (detailing the "preliminary skirmishes" which took place between the cit-
ies of Dallas and Fort Worth when the beginning of the aviation age created a
chaotic and random placement of airports in neighboring cities).
12 See Eric Torbenson, Southwest Sets Course for Repeal of Amendment Protecting Dal-
las Airport, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13, 2004, at IA (recording the end of
Southwest's neutrality on the Wright Amendment); see Repeal the Restrictions on
Dallas Love Field, supra note 1.
13 GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AiRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION
6 (1993).14 See The Airline Deregulations Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713 (West 2007)
[hereinafter ADA] (deregulating the airlines from fare and route controls).
15 See WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 49 (showing that nearly all U.S. carriers were
losing profits after deregulation).
16 Id. at xii.
17 See International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
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policy of industry deregulation, this regulation passed with care-
ful and thorough foresight, mandating government intervention
to protect public policy. The idea behind airline deregulation
was to create an open market of competition among the air-
lines.' When Congress carved the Wright Amendment as an
exception to the widespread deregulation, it did so for reasons
far beyond that of competition restrictions and low fare free-
doms.' 9 This policy remains as strong as the day of its inception,
and although it appears stifling to the idea of open competition,
the water runs deeper.
The Wright Amendment is settled law that has withstood
countless challenges throughout the court system. Successful
action to eliminate this law requires congressional approval of
an additional law to repeal the Wright Amendment. The courts
have carved a strong constitutional law that stands on the firm
footing of the commerce clause and deference to a knowledgea-
ble administrative agency. This Article explores the original and
current purposes of the Wright Amendment restrictions on di-
rect flights to and from Love Field, the current push to elimi-
nate those restrictions, and the reasons why Congress should
uphold the restrictions against any airline operating at Love
Field. Beginning in Part II, this Article clarifies the litigious his-
torical background which necessitated an equitable solution to
the further mounting conflict unleashed by industry deregula-
tion. Part III overviews the adaptation of federal airline industry
deregulation to rectify the inequities in the North Texas area.
Part IV asserts that courts have settled the law within the Wright
Amendment, leaving only congressional repealment as an op-
tion for destruction. Part IV also argues the policy for uphold-
ing the restriction. Although the legal arguments have played
out in the courts, any attack on the Wright Amendment goes
against its still valid originating policies.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Prior to the enactment of the Wright Amendment, the cities
of Dallas and Fort Worth "were engaged in a fierce, intense and
sometimes bitter rivalry for the business of commercial avia-
18 See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 10-11 (elaborating on the expectations
of airline deregulation).
19 See infra Part 1V.C.
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tion. ' ' 2 1 Dallas and Fort Worth are two large cities with down-
town business districts only thirty-one miles apart. This
proximity creates issues of convenience no matter where you lo-
cate any one airport.2' As each city designated its own separate
airport, the closeness of the two airports resulted in "unneces-
sary expense to the carriers as well as the taxpayers and inade-
quate and incomplete air service to both cities. "22 This long
history of inter-city rivalry and dispute led to congressional en-
actment of the Wright Amendment.
A. THE BATTLE TO ESTABLISH AIRPORTS IN NORTH TEXAS
Even today, many cities have logistical problems when trying
to implement new modes of transportation. 23 As public air
travel became a reality, many state infrastructures were unpre-
pared for the widespread arrival of the airplane.24 Without any
organization at the state level, Dallas and Fort Worth each
formed city airports in the 1920s to manage the increased air
traffic. 25 Fort Worth relied on Meacham Field,26 and the Dallas
City Council purchased Love Field after Fort Worth refused to
co-sponsor a regional airport.27 The short distance of thirty
miles28 separated the two commercial airports and created a
contemptuous separation between Fort Worth and Dallas far
greater than that short distance between the cities.
In 1940, Texas established the Texas Aeronautics Advisory
Committee (TAAC) as a unified solution to the growing aviation
world in a state "totally unprepared" for modern air travel. 29
When the TAAC examined the north Texas area, it suggested
one unified airport for the two cities. Planning for the loca-
20 City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1019 (N.D. Tex. 1973),
afj'd., 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
2) See id.
22 Id. at 1019-20.
23 See, e.g., Rad Sallee & Patrick Kurp, When Will Commuter Rail Arrive?, Hous-
TON CHRONICLE, Sept. 12, 2005, at B2 (explaining the hurdles again Houston's
goal for city-wide rail travel).
24 SCOTT & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 5.
25 Id. at 2-3.
26 Id. at 2. Meacham Field was built five miles north of downtown Fort Worth
and named after ex-Mayor H.C. Meacham. Id.
27 Id. at 3. Love Field, named after Moses Love, a young cavalry officer killed
in 1914, originated as an Army Air Corp field in 1917, which was later privately
purchased in 1918 and subsequently sold to Dallas in 1927. Id.
28 Id.
2 ld. at 5.
30 Id.
33
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tion of a unified airport proved to be an impossible task for Dal-
las and Fort Worth. After several years of negotiations, a
location was selected midway between the two cities.3 ' Arling-
ton, Texas, the city located between the two rivals, became the
new player, and the three cities engaged in "heated sessions on
the exact location, management, and operation" of an airport to
be called "Midway. '3 2 Eventually, the fighting resulted in both
Dallas and Fort Worth withdrawing from the Midway negotia-
tions, relying instead on their mutually outdated airports.3
With help from the airlines and federal funding, Arlington inde-
pendently built Midway Airport 4.3  However, without the sup-
port of Dallas and Fort Worth to include Midway in their
aviation plans, the airport was seen as useless after the govern-
ment stopped using it after World War II ended in 1946.15
In 1947, Fort Worth purchased Midway from Arlington for
one dollar. 6 In addition, Fort Worth purchased 378 acres south
of Midway and announced its plan to spend over $11,000,000 on
making Midway a major airport.3 7 Subsequently, Dallas fought
hard to improve Love Field and taint the image of the new
Greater Fort Worth International Airport (GFWIA), further
driving the cities apart.3 ' The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), a
federal agency, blessed Fort Worth's GFWIA as the regional air-
port and allocated $340,000 of federal funds to have GFWIA
serve the entire north Texas area.39 Dallas officials began a con-
gressional fight to halt federal money from going to an airport
which one representative claimed "is to be built for the purpose
of destroying Love Field."4 ° After Dallas' failed attempt to con-
vince Congress or the CAA to withdraw funding, Dallas unsuc-
cessfully took the fight to the courts, which dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction and deference to the agency's discre-
31 Id.
32 Id. at 6-7.
33 Id. at 9-11.
34 See id. at 9-11.
35 See id. at 11-12.
36 Id. at 17.
37 Id.
38 Id. Several Dallas newspapers coined the name "Nineteen-Mile Airport" for
GFWIA to remind Dallasites of the distant location of GFWIA. See, e.g., Dorothea
McGrath, Airport Debate Boils Up Over Future Traffic, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
9, 1951, at part III, 1, 13.
39 SCoTT & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 18.
40 Id. at 19 (quoting Hearing on Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and Judici-
ary Appropriations Bill for 1949 Before the S. Comm. of Appropriations, 81st Cong. 369
(1949)).
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tion .4  Although Dallas continued to seek improvements for
Love Field, Fort Worth opened its airport renamed as "Carter
Field" on April 24, 1953.42 As the feud between Dallas and Fort
Worth continued, the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) assumed
the job of mediator between two old rivals.43 For several years
after Carter Field opened, the two airports fought for the CAB's
approval of routes and market share of air travel in north
Texas. 44 Love Field "instituted a vigorous improvement pro-
gram" in 1954, and by 1958, Love Field prospered at the ex-
pense of quickly outdated and distant Carter Field.45
By the 1960s, the new jets of the era rocketed over the urban
residential area surrounding Love Field.46 While this signaled
success and cued expansion for Love Field, the proximity of the
proposed new runway, added noise, and safety concerns ignited
a string of battles in the courts.47 Love Field was losing its edge,
and nearby residents, airlines, and the city of Fort Worth were
all pushing for a regional airport solution. 48 After the CAB felt
it could no longer keep both cities happy, it launched the Dal-
las-Fort Worth Regional Airport Investigation, in the interest of
41 See id. at 19-22; seeCity of Dallas v. Rentzel, 172 F.2d 122, 123 (5th Cir. 1949)
(holding a lack of special statutory reviewjurisdiction required by the Administra-
tive Procedure Act).
42 Scoti & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 23. The Fort Worth city council passed a
resolution to name the terminal at GFWIA after Amon G. Carter, a local business-
man responsible for funding the administration building. Id. at 21.
43 See id. at 20. The CAB was created by the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and
was in charge of economic regulation of commercial air travel-setting fares and
regulating routes. See The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat.
973 (1938) (amended 1958).
44 ScoT-r & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 27-28. Within these disputes, Dallas sued
the CAB when it granted Central Airlines a route that designated Carter Field as
the airport serving the Dallas area, further drawing a line in the sand between the
two competing airports. See City of Dallas v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 221 F.2d 501,
504 (1954) (allowing the CAB to designate a central airport if it was in the public
interest to have a unified airport).
45 ScoTr & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 34-35.
46 See id. at 42-43.
47 See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 409-414 (1964); Atkinson v. City
of Dallas, 353 S.W.2d 275, 276-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ denied).
These cases sought an injunction to restrain the city from building an additional
runway at Love Field and from issuing bonds to cover the cost. See Atkinson, 353
S.W.2d at 276-79. Donovan was a continuation of the Atkinson case and effectively
delayed Dallas from building the new runway until the case settled in 1964 after
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case on secondary grounds.
Id.; ScoTT & DAvis, supra note 11, at 43.
48 Scorr & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 41-43.
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public convenience and necessity. 49 The announcement of the
investigation brought "optimistic and grateful expressions from
Fort Worth" but "resentment and determined opposition from
Dallas.""0
Hearings in the investigation began onJuly 10, 1963, and over
one year later, the board unanimously decided that the DFW
area should be served through one regional airport.5 1 Dallas
and Fort Worth finally cooperated and agreed to build a re-
gional airport located between the two cities. 52 The cities jointly
selected an engineering firm to select the location of the new
regional airport.53 On September 25, 1965, a location just north
of Carter Field 54 became breaking ground for a massive new air-
port that would later be named Dallas-Fort Worth International
Airport (DFW).
B. PLANNING FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE NEW AIRPORT
The cities of Dallas and Fort Worth created and staffed the
new Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Board that would over-
see the creation of a new airport to serve both cities. 56 To fi-
nance the airport, the Board authorized the issuance of bonds
through a 1968 Bond Ordinance. 57 Through the Dallas-Fort
49 CAB Orders Hearings on Regional Airfield for Dallas Fort Worth: Local Leaders Op-
pose Inquiry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 22, 1962, at 1. The order setting up the
investigation stated that "[the CAB] intend[s] systematically to focus on each situ-
ation in which there is a potential public interest in providing service to closely
located communities through a single airport," and explaining that the "use of
multiple airports by the scheduled airlines tends to diminish the services to each
airport and increase the cost of air transportation." Id. at 6.
5o Id. at 1.
51 ScoTT & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 46-49. The CAB first reached a decision
that neither airport should be designated; however, after cooperation failed to
solve the problem between the cities, the investigation was reviewed, and the CAB
gave the cities 180 days to select a single facility. Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 At this time, Carter Field was actually referred to as Greater Southwest Inter-
national Airport (GSIA)-renamed in 1962 as an attempt to pacify Dallas into
approving GSIA as the regional airport. Id. at 43, 49-50.
55 Carl Harris, Airport Site Includes Greater Southwest; Overlaps County Line: Little
Change Expected in Love Role, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 1965, at IA; 'Square'
Has a Reason For Its 'X' Shape, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 8, 1970, at DI.
56 Scorr & DAVIS, supra note 11, at 57. The Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Air-
port Board contained eleven members staffed by both cities in proportion to
their relative population-Dallas having seven members and Fort Worth having
four. Id.
57 See City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (N.D. Tex.
1973) (concluding in a victory for Southwest Airlines continued operation at
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Worth Regional Airport Joint Revenue Bonds, both cities in-
tended to:
... take such steps as may be necessary, appropriate and legally
permissible (without violating presently outstanding legal com-
mitments or covenants prohibiting such action), to provide for
the orderly, efficient and effective phase-out at Love Field, Red-
bird, GSIA and Meacham Field, of any and all Certificated Air
Carrier Services, and to transfer such activities to [DFW] effective
upon the beginning of operations at the [DFW] airport.5"
In taking such substantial steps to create a regional airport,
the Bond Ordinance had to carry with it the intent to bind both
cities in the mutual endeavor to ensure that no previous rivalry5 9
between the cities would hinder the success of DFW.6 ° In accor-
dance with the Bond Ordinance and its stated objectives, the
Board executed a Letter of Agreement with every airline61 then
serving the Dallas-Fort Worth area.62 The agreements stated
that each airline would "move all of its Certificated Air Carrier
Services serving the Dallas-Fort Worth area to [DFW]" in accor-
dance with the 1968 Bond Ordinance. 63 The agreements en-
sured that sufficient revenues would be available to operate
DFW, and because every airline was required to move, the cities
of Dallas and Fort Worth attempted to shutdown all "Certifi-
cated Air Carrier Services"64 at all other area airports.6 5 The
Love Field), affd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (quot-
ing Dallas, Tex., Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance 12,352 § 9.5
(1968)).
58 Id. (quoting Dallas, Tex., Regional Airport Concurrent Bond Ordinance
12,352 § 9.5A (1968)).
59 U.S. District Court Judge William M. Taylor, Jr. described the rivalry be-
tween the two cities as "fierce, intense and sometimes bitter rivalry for the busi-
ness of commercial aviation and commercial air carriers." Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F.
Supp. at 1019.
60 The Bond Ordinance further stated that neither city would implement any
policy or action which would be "competitive with or in opposition to the opti-
mum development of [DFW]." Eric A. Allen, Comment, The Wright Amendment:
The Constitutionality and Propriety of the Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, 55 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 1011, 1015 (1990) (quoting Dallas, Tex., Regional Airport Concurrent
Bond Ordinance 12,352 § 9.5B (1968)).
61 The eight airlines serving the Dallas area at this time were American Air-
lines, Braniff Airways, Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Eastern Air Lines,
Frontier Airlines, Ozark Air Lines, and Texas International Airlines. See Sw. Air-
lines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1020-21 n.1.
62 Id. at 1020-1021.
63 Id. at 1021.
64 See id. at 1027 (discussing "Certificated Air Carrier Services" as it is defined
in the 1968 Bond Ordinance). A general definition would include an air carrier
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Board did not intend to render the competing airports useless,
but rather this measure restricted the use of the area airports to
operations that fell outside of the air carrier category.66 These
operations, carved out by the Bond Ordinance, allowed the area
airports to continue some revenue generating operations rather
than subject each city to waste the substantial investments
placed in their respective airports. The continued operation of
Love Field and the Board's vulnerable attempt to carve out a use
for the airport was soon to become the target of a new carrier-
Southwest Airlines.
C. THE UNEXPECTED BATTLE FOR AIRPORT CONSOLIDATION
In 1966, attorney Herbert Kelleher67 was approached by Rol-
lin King, a previous client, with an idea to start a regional airline
to serve the Texas cities of Dallas, San Antonio, and Houston.6"
On March 15, 1967, Kelleher incorporated Southwest Airlines,
Co. and began raising capital to begin air service.69 Prior to
1978, federal and state governments regulated the airline indus-
try by controlling fares, routes, and airport entry.70 Thus, in or-
der to begin service, Kelleher filed the airline's application to fly
between the three cities with the Texas Aeronautics Commission
(TAC)".7 After a few startup delays, Southwest began service on
that was licensed by a governmental authority to conduct a scheduled service.
See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. §§ 119.1-119.3 (2007) (stating the most recent federal defini-
tions explaining this term).
65 Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1020-21.
66 See id. at 1028 (listing examples of the types of operations that fall outside of
"Certificated Air Carrier Services"); but cf Harris, supra note 55, at 1A (quoting
Dallas Mayor Johnson's expectation that Love Field will be "even wider open (in
usage) after [Dallas] get[s] the new airport").
67 At this time, Herb Kelleher was an attorney at Matthews, Nowlin, Macfarlane
& Barrett. Reference for Bus., Biography of Herb Kelleher, http://www.refer-
enceforbusiness.com/biography/F-L/Kelleher-Herb-1931.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2007).
68 FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at 15.
69 The airline was originally incorporated as Air Southwest Co. and later
changed to Southwest Airlines. Id. at 16.
70 See The Airline Deregulations Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713 (West 2007)
(deregulating the airlines from fare and route controls).
71 As Southwest intended to provide an air service which operated wholly
within the state of Texas, it was able to obtain a certificate from the state regula-
tory agency rather than the federal CAB. FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at
16, 22; see also Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1021 (discussing the certificate
issued by the TAC for Southwest's Dallas operation).
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June 18, 1971.72 With DFW still under construction, Love Field
remained the only commercial airport serving the Dallas area.v3
As the earlier Letters of Agreement from the Dallas-Fort Worth
Airport Board were executed in 1970, Southwest was not bound
by the agreements the other carriers signed as they had not yet
begun service in the Dallas area.7 1 In October of 1971, South-
west Airlines informed the DFW Board that it had no plan to
move to the new airport in accordance with the 1968 Bond Or-
dinance.75 Although Southwest participated earlier in planning
sessions to comply with the ordinance, it withdrew from those
sessions and refused to execute a similar letter agreement with
the Board. Every other airline then serving Dallas agreed to
relocate at the request of the city. 76 There was an obvious ad-
vantage for Southwest to be the only carrier at the more conve-
nient Love Field airport, as the airline intended to "cater[ ] to
business travelers who wanted to get into and out of the city
quickly. '7 7 One month later, as Southwest was given the liberty
to select any airport for service through the TAC's certifica-
tion, 78 the airline moved from Houston's Intercontinental Air-
port to the closer and vacant Hobby Airport when the airline
was proving unsuccessful in drawing passengers and was "bleed-
ing money. ' 79 Airlines moving to DFW were "outraged at
[Southwest's] refusal to join them at the new regional airport."80
Many believed that Southwest took an unfair market advantage,
and that the advantage was at the expense of two cities that
painstakingly planned to unite at one airport compelled by the
CAB's Regional Airport Investigation.8 1 Over a year before DFW
72 Sw. Airlines Co., Southwest Airlines Fact Sheet, http://www.southwest.com/
aboutswa/press/factsheet.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
73 See Doug Domeier, DFW Airport Ready for Dedication, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Sept. 22, 1973, at Al (announcing the official opening of Dallas-Fort Worth Inter-
national Airport).
74 See City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1020 (N.D. Tex.
1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974).
75 Id. at 1021.
76 Id.
77 FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at 22-23.
78 See, e.g., Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1021 (stating that the TAC author-
ized the airline to serve the Dallas-Fort Worth region through "any" airport in the
area).
79 FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at 22-23.
80 Id. at 24.
81 See Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1020 (detailing the CAB's order giving
the cities 180 days to agree on a single airport plan or the CAB would regulate
the carriers to conduct service through an airport of the CAB's choice).
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opened its doors, Dallas, Fort Worth, and the Dallas-Fort Worth
Regional Airport Board sued Southwest Airlines seeking a de-
claratory judgment stating their right to exclude Southwest from
Love Field once DFW airport opened. 2 The U.S. Court for the
Northern District of Texas ruled that Southwest Airlines could
not be excluded from Love Field operations.8 3 As Southwest
Airlines operated only within Texas and was certificated by the
TAC, any CAB order to move to a regional airport was pre-
empted by the State's right to control a wholly intrastate'4 air-
line. 5 The court held that because Southwest was the only TAC-
certified intrastate airline operating at Love Field, and therefore
the only intrastate airline restricted by the Bond Ordinance, the
Ordinance was "unjustly discriminatory."86 Herb Kelleher,
along with a team of other attorneys, won the right to reject the
request of Dallas, Fort Worth, and their airport board to have
Southwest join the other airlines serving the Dallas area at
DFW.
87
III. THE EXCEPTION TO DEREGULATION
A. THE DEREGULATION OF AiRLINE TRAVEL
The CAB's Dallas-Fort Worth Regional Airport Investigation
of 1963 established that a single airport would be utilized in the
Dallas area.88 As the CAB held the interstate strings, Southwest
obtaining the right to conduct interstate travel from Love Field
would be impossible. Southwest's evasion of CAB regulation
82 Id. at 1018-21.
83 Id. at 1034.
84 Intrastate refers to operations which are only entirely within the borders of a
single state and are outside the authority of federal powers. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 285 (8th ed. 2004) (defining intrastate and interstate commerce); see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
85 See Robert B. Gilbreath & Paul C. Watler, Perimeter Rules, Proprietary Powers,
and The Airline Deregulation Act: A Tale of Two Cities... And Two Airports, 66J. AIR
L. & COM. 223, 226 (stating that Southwest's intrastate operations were exempt
from federal regulations).
86 Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1028. Intrastate operations authorized by the
CAB were not included in the Bond Ordinance which the court felt discrimi-
nated against Southwest even though each CAB carrier was bound by the Letters
of Agreement not to operate a service at Love. See id. at 1027 (holding that the
1968 Bond Ordinance was only applicable to those intrastate services authorized
by the TAC-namely only Southwest at that time).
87 Id. at 1034.
88 See supra text accompanying note 51.
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would also bind Southwest Airlines to intrastate service.8 9 How-
ever, when Congress passed the 1978 ADA, ° Southwest seized
the opportunity of federal deregulation to expand into markets
that the CAB would not previously authorize." Immediately,
Southwest applied for the right to launch direct service from
Love Field to New Orleans through the ADA's automatic market
entry program.9 2 In granting the application, the CAB rejected
the argument that the ADA allowed a city such as Dallas, which
owns Love Field, to restrict the services rendered at that airport
as a right granted to the proprietor.93 Congress reacted strongly
to the CAB's decision to allow Southwest Airlines to begin an
interstate service from Love Field, and in one day of delibera-
tion, the U.S. House of Representatives, with Congressman Jim
Wright, then House Majority Leader, banned all interstate air
service into and out of Love Field through an amendment to the
International Air Transportation Competition Act.94 As the
amendment was headed to the Senate for approval, Herb Kelle-
her and one of Washington's foremost lobbyists, J.D. Williams,
obtained Senate influence to ease restrictions in the amend-
ment.9 5 Eventually, both houses adopted a relaxed version of
the original amendment, eventually referred to as the "Wright
Amendment."9 " The Wright Amendment provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), notwithstanding any
other provision of law, neither the Secretary of Transportation,
89 See Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. at 1021-22 (holding that Southwest was not
subject to the 1964 CAB ruling that all regulated carriers must be moved to a
single airport).
90 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713 (West 2007). The ADA essentially removed govern-
ment control from the airline industry and stripped the CAB from its power to
regulate routes and fares. Id.; see generally WILtAMS, supra note 13 (detailing the
significant market shift that occurred when the ADA was enacted).
91 See FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at 25 (showing how Southwest
"quickly took advantage of the interstate freedom afforded by deregulation").
92 See Gilbreath & Wader, supra note 85, at 226; see also Allen, supra note 60, at
1017 (explaining the Automatic Market Entry program as one which "allowed
carriers to enter certain markets prior to complete route deregulation"). The
application to allow Southwest to begin interstate travel from Love Field was op-
posed "vehemently" by supporters of DFW Airport. FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra
note 7, at 25.
93 See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1023 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 907 (1991) (providing background to a constitutional attack on the Wright
Amendment).
94 FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at 25; see Allen, supra note 60, at 1019.
95 FREIBERG & FREIBERG, Supra note 7, at 27.
96 See generally International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
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the Civil Aeronautics Board, nor any other officer or employee of
the United States shall issue, reissue, amend, revise, or otherwise
modify (either by action or inaction) any certificate or other au-
thority to permit or otherwise authorize any person to provide
the transportation of individuals, by air, as a common carrier for
compensation or hire between Love Field, Texas, and one or
more points outside the State of Texas, except (1) charter air
transportation not to exceed ten flights per month, and (2) air
transportation provided by commuter airlines operating aircraft
with a passenger capacity of 56 passengers or less.
(b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c), notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law, or any certificate or other author-
ity heretofore or hereafter issued thereunder, no person shall
provide or offer to provide the transportation of individuals, by
air, for compensation or hire as a common carrier between Love
Field, Texas, and one or more points outside the State of Texas,
except that a person providing service to a point outside the
State of Texas from Love Field on November 1, 1979, may con-
tinue to provide service to such point.
(c) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply with respect to, and it
is found consistent with the public convenience and necessity to
authorize, transportation of individuals, by air, on a flight be-
tween Love Field, Texas, and one or more points within the
States of Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and
Texas by an air carrier, if (1) such air carrier does not offer or
provide any through service or ticketing with another air carrier
or foreign air carrier, and (2) such air carrier does not offer for
sale transportation to or from, and the flight or aircraft does not
serve, any point which is outside any such State. Nothing in this
subsection shall be construed to give authority not otherwise pro-
vided by law to the Secretary of Transportation, the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, any other officer or employee of the United
States, or any other person.97
The Wright Amendment contains three sections, each having
some effect on the operation of Love Field Airport. Section (a)
sets out the general prohibition of all interstate flights from
Love Field as originally intended by its first draft in the House of
Representatives.98 Section (a) then provides two exceptions for
interstate travel which do not apply to Southwest Airlines - (1)
chartered air transportation 99 and (2) commuter airlines operat-
ing aircraft with a passenger capacity of fifty-six passengers or
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Charter air transportation is a travel arrangement in which transportation is
hired by and for one specific group of people. Id.
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less.100 Section (b) provides an exception that only applied to
Southwest's Love Field-New Orleans route; however, that excep-
tion is made redundant by the inclusion of Louisiana in section
(c). 0 1
The restrictions within section (c) are what are traditionally
thought of as the "Wright Amendment;" 102 however, this term
includes both of the limitations in sections (a) and (b).' °
These sections provided a significant interstate exception to
Southwest in that they allowed travel, withstanding additional re-
strictions within section (c), to four named states11 4-Louisiana,
Arkansas, Oklahoma, and New Mexico. 0 5 Section (c) restricts
airlines utilizing section (c) by stating that the carrier may not
provide "any through service or ticketing with another carrier"
and may not offer10 6 its own through service from a point
outside of those states."0 7
At the time of its enactment, it is likely that Southwest ap-
proved of the outcome in the Wright Amendment. Prior to der-
egulation, Southwest had boxed itself into the state of Texas
from Love Field by refusing to comply with the CAB order and
requests of the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth and by relying
wholly on the authority of the TAC to conduct its Love Field
service. 0 8 Faced with a House of Representatives who preferred
to restrict Southwest's Love Field operation to the pre-deregula-
1oo Id. At the time, Southwest Airlines' entire aircraft fleet was comprised of
the Boeing 737-200 and was configured with a passenger capacity of over 100. See
FREIBERG & FREiBERG, supra note 7, at 19.
101 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
102 The "Wright Amendment" is also sometimes referred to as the "Love Field
Amendment." See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1022 (5th Cir. 1991) (refer-
ring to § 29 of the International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 as
the "Love Field Amendment").
103 See id. at 1023 (boiling the Wright Amendment down to the prohibition of
airlines from "offering single ticket interstate service from Love Field except to
the four states contiguous to Texas").
104 These states are commonly referred to as the "Love Field Service Area." Id.
105 See International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
106 The term "offer" or "offer for sale" within the Wright Amendment Section
(c) effectively prevents Southwest from advertising or offering a passenger service
which would connect at a Love Field Service Area destination and continue on to
a destination outside of that area. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 60, at 1011 (intro-
ducing a scenario which is a direct result of this "offer" language).
107 International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-
192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
108 See supra Part II.C.
443
444 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tion boundary lines of the State, when the Wright Amendment
included provisions for interstate travel, the airline seemed sup-
portive of the Wright Amendment.10 9 Southwest was now able
to operate a "safe-harbor" at convenient Love Field while other
now deregulated airlines were bound under the Letter Agree-
ments at DFW." °
B. DEFINING THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT RESTRICTIONS
Southwest Airlines quickly expanded its service into the sur-
rounding cities."1  Described as "dreadfully framed" by one
court, the need for court interpretations to define the scope of
the Wright Amendment emerged. 112 Because Love Field was a
far more convenient airport for Dallas residents, Continental
Airlines saw an opportunity to utilize both DFW and Love in the
deregulated era.'1 3 After a request by Continental Airlines to
start service between Love Field and Houston, Texas, the De-
partment of Transportation (DOT) conducted an "informal en-
forcement investigation.""' 4 Southwest Airlines strongly urged
the DOT to prevent Continental from encroaching on their
turf; 1 5 however, the DOT interpreted the amendment favorably
109 See, e.g., Hearing on the Wright Amendment Before the Subcomm. on Aviation, S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 8 (2005) (statement of Kevin E.
Cox, Chief Operating Officer, Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport) (provid-
ing evidence that the Wright Amendment was "language which Southwest Air-
lines supports as a compromise on the Love Field interstate service controversy"
and quoting a letter drafted byJ.D. Williams to Congress on December 11, 1979);
see id. (stating Herb Kelleher was reported by the Fort Worth Star-Telegram as
having accepted the "final resolution" in the long battle against service at Love
Field).
110 Statement of Kevin Cox, supra note 109, at 11.
11 See FREIBURG & FREIBURG, supra note 7, at 26 (illustrating the strategy South-
west used to expand its network post-Wright).
112 See, e.g., Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1446 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
113 See id. at 1445-46.
114 See Love Field Amendment Proceeding, Order No. 85-12-81, 51 Fed. Reg.
467, 467 (Dec. 31, 1985) (defining the scope of the Wright Amendment).
115 See generally Sw. Airlines Co., Response to Order 85-7-65, Filed in the Love
Amendment Proceeding Before the Department of Transportation (Aug. 23,
1985) (stating Southwest's desire to keep out a competing larger carrier). South-
west stated:
The proper uses of Love Field clearly do not include the sort of
service contemplated by Continental. The airline intends to begin
with seven daily round trips to its hub at Houston Intercontinental,
from which it flies to all sections of the country. But the congressio-
nally assigned role of large interlining carriers is to compete in the
Dallas/Fort Worth area by suing the airport that was built from
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for Continental Airlines.' 6 The DOT's interpretation allowed
air carriers to "double ticket"'1 17 passengers to destinations be-
yond the Love Field Service Area; however, it restricted the air-
line from advertising this service."" As Southwest now met
competition at vacant Love Field, it joined the DFW Board and
cities in a petition to the D.C. Circuit to review the interpreta-
tion of the DOT.'19 Southwest argued that the Wright Amend-
ment barred an airline like Continental from operating at Love
Field because Continental was an "interlining"121 carrier, and as
such, was restricted under section (c) (1) of the Wright Amend-
ment.121 Southwest's interpretation would prevent competition
them at their request-DFW Regional. They have deliberately
been precluded from providing interstate transportation at Love
Field, and the Department should so declare.
Id. at 12.
116 Love Field Amendment Proceeding, Order No. 85-12-81, 51 Fed. Reg. at
467. The Department of Transportation concluded that:
[b]ased on its review of the comments and other relevant materials,
including the Amendment's legislative history, the Department has
decided that: (1) Continental's proposed service between Love
Field and Houston, Texas, does not violate the Love Field Amend-
ment; (2) the Amendment does not apply to flights by intrastate
carriers or intrastate service by "air carriers"; (3) upon the request
of passengers, Continental or its agents may sell "double tickets" to
passengers continuing on a different aircraft and flight beyond an
authorized destination from Love Field; (4) however, neither Con-
tinental nor its agents may list in any manner, including a com-
puter reservation system, a flight from Love Field as a "connection"
to a point beyond the Love Field authorized service area; (5) Delta,
or any other airline, may list in its computer reservation system
flights from Love Field by a certificated carrier using small aircraft
in the same manner a commuter carrier flights; and (6) carriers
may provide service between Love Filed and other points within the
state of Texas so long as they do not use this service to avoid the
Love Field Amendment's restrictions on interstate air service.
Id.
117 See Cont'l Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1455. The court stated that the DOT defini-
tion of double ticketing
involves the purchase by a passenger of two separate tickets: one for
service from Love Field to a point within Texas or the four adjacent
states (Love Field Service Area), and a separate, second ticket for
service from that destination to a point beyond the authorized Love
Field Service Area.
Id. (quoting the DOT brief to the court).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 An interlining carrier is one which has connecting flights with other air-
lines. Id.
121 Id. at 1447.
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at Love Field from larger airlines since most major carriers were
interlined. When Southwest fought so hard in the past to be the
only airline at Love Field, it was clear why Southwest would want
such a broad restrictive interpretation of the Wright Amend-
ment. 122 Ironically, Southwest found itself supporting the DFW
board and did not want the courts to permit Love access to the
"largest and best established [airlines] in the country."'123 Ulti-
mately, the U.S. Court of Appeals upheld the DOT's interpreta-
tion of the Wright Amendment and allowed Continental and
other airlines the right to use Dallas Love Field. 24
Continental's request to the DOT established clarity to the is-
sue of "double ticketing" as a measure around the Love Field
Service Area. 125 The DOT order stated that an airline could not
in any way solicit or advertise a connecting service outside of the
Love Field Service or provide a reduced fare when a passenger
purchased "double tickets. ' 126 At the time, Continental pro-
vided non-stop service from Houston to Miami, Florida.1 27 The
new DOT interpretation would allow Continental to begin a
Love Field-Houston service.' 28 A passenger could, therefore, fly
from Love Field to Miami, Florida using a "double ticket." How-
ever, the DOT interpretation requires that the passenger
purchase two tickets and operate each leg as its own flight, col-
122 See generally Brief of Petitioner Sw. Airlines, Co., Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v.
Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Nos. 86-1026, 86-1039, 86-
1040). Southwest was likely pleased with the non-competitive Wright Amend-
ment arrangement as it argued that:
Beyond doubt, DOT's construction of the law will make these eco-
nomic and social policies, in this Court's words, 'more difficult of
fulfillment.' Permitting wider access to Love Field by a larger
group of airlines which includes not merely short-haul specialist
carriers but some of the largest and best established firms in the
country can only exacerbate those local concerns which prompted
Congress to enact this unique solution to a unique problem. It will
tend toward replacing the fragile peace achieved through compro-
mise with rancor and divisiveness which plagued the courts, Con-
gress and the parties for so many years.
Id.
123 Id.
124 Cont'l Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1444, 1449 (deferring to the DOT's reasonable
interpretations of the Wright Amendment under the Chevron standard).
125 Id. at 1449.
126 See Allen, supra note 60, at 1022 (explaining the restrictions of "double
tickets").
127 Airchive.com, Continental Timetable, http://www.airchive.com/SITE%20
PAGES/TIMETABLES-CONTINENTAL.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
128 Cont'l Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1444.
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lecting bags in Houston and checking them again for the flight
to Miami. As Continental could not discount this double ticket
in any way, this measure was both inconvenient and
expensive. 1 29
An additional provision of the Wright Amendment that
awaited interpretation was section (a) (2)."' Although South-
west argued that this exception should be read as two restrictive
clauses,13" ' the court dismissed this in favor of the DOT interpre-
tation.' 3 2 Airlines, and even Congress, would soon find a way to
expand this interpretation, even at the protest of the DOT.
C. EXPANDING THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT
Upset that it was not included within the Love Field Service
Area, the state of Kansas filed suit to have the Wright Amend-
ment invalidated on constitutional grounds in hopes of luring
Southwest Airlines to their state. 33  The case was dismissed on
summary judgment,'34 but Kansas would soon bring the Wright
Amendment back to the floors of Congress.135
Meanwhile, Legend Airlines announced plans to manipulate
the seating configuration of its aircraft to comply with the fifty-
six seat exception within section (c) (1) of the Wright Amend-
ment.1"6 When Legend sought the approval of the DOT, the
department issued a ruling that "unless the aircraft is originally
configured to hold fifty-six or fewer passenger, the exception
does not apply.' 37 Hope was not lost, as one year later both
129 See Allen, supra note 60, at 1011.
130 Section (a) (2) provides an exception for "air transportation provided by
commuter airlines operating aircraft with a passenger capacity of 56 passengers
or less." International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No.
96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
131 Southwest argued that the exception contains two elements-(1) that the
airline be a commuter airline, and (2) that it also operate aircraft with 56 seats or
fewer. Cont'l Air Lines, 843 F.2d at 1454. The DOT interpretation simply reads
one element which defines commuter airline-56 passengers or less. Id.
132 Id.
133 See generally Kansas v. United States, 797 F. Supp. 1042, 1042 (D.D.C. 1992),
affid, 16 F.3d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (claiming standing through the added expense
of double ticketing, and asserting violations of the Port Preference Clause, First
Amendment rights, and the right to interstate travel).
134 Id. at 1042.
135 See infra note 139 and accompanying text.
136 SeeAm. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000); see also International Air Transportation Com-
petition Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-192, § 29, 94 Stat. 35, 48-49 (1980).
137 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 794.
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Kansas and Legend Airlines would find relief through the 1997
passage of the "Shelby Amendment."
138
Motivated by the low fares Southwest Airlines provided, Kan-
sas and other state legislators, not pleased with the results in the
courts, introduced an amendment that would expand on the re-
strictions of the Wright Amendment.13 9 Senator Richard Shelby
of Alabama, among those legislators offended by what he
thought were high fares in his state, spearheaded an addition to
the Wright Amendment that would add five additional states to
the Love Field Service Area.14 By the time it received approval
from both Houses, the "Shelby Amendment" contained only
three states-Kansas, Alabama, and Mississippi. 4 ' In addition,
the amendment contained clarification which overturned the
DOT's interpretation of the fifty-six seat restriction. 14 2 As Leg-
end Airlines was previously prevented from conducting their
reconfigured aircraft service from Love, the clarification allowed
the seat reconfiguration to bypass any congressional restric-
tions.143 The new law effectively allowed any airline, including
138 See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-66, § 337, 111 Stat. 1425, 1447 (1997).
139 See id.
140 Catalina Camia, Shelby Wants Love Field Limits Expanded by 5 States, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Oct. 1, 1997, at 3D.
141 Catalina Camia, Congress Votes to Make Change at Love Field: Wright Amendment
Eased to Extend Nonstop Service, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 10, 1997, at 1D.
142 See id.; see also Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1445
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
143 Congress Votes to Make Change, supra note 141, at 1D; see also § 337, 111 Stat.
at 1447 (1997). The Wright Amendment was amended as follows:
(a) In General . . . For purposes of the exception set forth in sec-
tion 29(a) (2) of the International Air Transportation Competition
Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-192; 94 Stat. 48), the term "passenger
capacity of 56 passengers or less" includes any aircraft, except air-
craft exceeding gross aircraft weight of 300,000 pounds, recon-
figured to accommodate 56 or fewer passengers if the total number
of passenger seats installed on the aircraft does not exceed 56.
(b) Inclusion of Certain States in Exemption. The first sentence of
section 29(c) of the International Air Transportation Competition
Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-192; 94 Stat. 48 et seq.) is amended by
inserting "Kansas, Alabama, Mississippi," before "and Texas."
(c) Safety Assurance. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration shall monitor the safety of flight operations in the
Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area and take such actions as may
be necessary to ensure safe aviation operations. If the Administra-
tor must restrict aviation operations in the Dallas-Fort Worth area
to ensure safety, the Administrator shall notify the House and Sen-
ate Committees on Appropriations as soon as possible that an un-
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Southwest,'44 to operate most fifty-six seat configured aircraft to
destinations outside the Love Field Service Area. 4 '
Although Fort Worth and Dallas had maintained an amicable
relationship in comparison to their earlier history, relations be-
gan to deteriorate after the passage of the Shelby Amend-
ment.'46 As Fort Worth likely saw the imminent decline of
services available at its closest airport, the city filed suit against
Dallas and others claiming that allowing Dallas to utilize the ad-
ditions of the Shelby Amendment violated the 1968 Bond Ordi-
nance.'4 7 Eventually, the state court ruled in favor of Fort
Worth in summary judgment requiring Dallas to prohibit the
expanded services allowed through the Shelby Amendment. 148
Subsequently, the DOT commenced its own proceeding to ad-
dress the same issues before the state court.149 In a ruling that
essentially directly opposed the state court's decision, the DOT
ruled:
(i) the City of Fort Worth may not enforce any commitment by
the City of Dallas ... to limit operations at Love Field authorized
by federal law, and the proprietary powers of the City of Dallas
do not allow it to restrict services at Love Field authorized by
federal law; (ii) the ability of the City of Dallas to limit the type of
airline service operated at Love Field is preempted by the Wright
and Shelby Amendments; (iii) any airline operating aircraft with
a passenger capacity of no more than 56 passengers and a gross
aircraft weight of no more than 300,000 pounds may operate ser-
vice with any type of equipment and flights of any length from or
safe airspace management situation existed requiring the
restrictions.
§ 337, 111 Stat. at 1447 (1997).
144 Southwest Airlines operates a fleet entirely composed of various versions of
the Boeing 737. Sw. Airlines Co., Fact Sheet, http://www.southwest.com/about_
swa/press/factsheet.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007). The largest version of this
aircraft at its heaviest weight falls well short of the 300,000 pound limit. See Boe-
ing Co., 737 Airplane Description, http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737
family/pf/pf_900ERtech.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) (giving the technical
description of the Boeing 737 aircraft).
145 See Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-66, § 337, 111 Stat. 1425, 1447 (1997).
146 In re City of Dallas, 977 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet.
denied).
147 See id.
148 See Gilbreath & Wader, supra note 85, at 233 (interpreting City of Fort
Worth, Texas, No. 48-171109-97 (48th Dist. Ct., Tarrant County, Tex. Oct. 15,
1998).
149 SeeAm. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 794 (5th Cir. 2000),
cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1274 (2000).
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to Love Field, notwithstanding any claim that such service vio-
lates any agreement between the Cities of Dallas and Fort Worth;
(iv) the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport Board may not
enforce any contract provision that allegedly bars an airline from
operating interstate airline service at another airport in the Dal-
las-Fort Worth metropolitan area; and (v) any airline may offer
through service between Love Field, and any other point to pas-
sengers using a flight between Love Field and another point
within Texas operated under subsection (a) of the Wright
Amendment, as amended by the Shelby Amendment.... 15 0
With two differing rulings, Fort Worth appealed the DOT rul-
ing to the Fifth Circuit,151 while Dallas appealed the state court
lawsuit to the Court of Appeals for the Second District of
Texas.152 Although it looked as though both courts would again
reach separate opinions, the Texas court issued a staying order
to await the opinion of the Fifth Circuit.1 53 The DOT order
emerged virtually untouched by the Fifth Circuit's opinion. 1
54
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit, like the DOT, held that the pre-
emption provision of the ADA precluded the 1968 Bond Ordi-
nance's interference of the Wright and Shelby Amendments. 155
In addition, the court stressed that although Dallas owned the
airport, proprietary powers do not extend to areas which in-
fringe on the congressional right to regulate commerce. 156 The
court cited cases which deferred to proprietary powers; however,
it then distinguished the fact patterns from the issues at Love
Field. 5 ' Fundamentally, this took any teeth from the 1968
Bond Ordinance that restricted Dallas from allowing Love Field
to operate in accordance with the Wright and Shelby Amend-
150 Id. at 795 (quoting Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding, U.S.
Dep't of Transp., Order No. 98-12-27 (Dec. 23, 1998)).
15' See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 788.
152 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83, 86-91 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.).
153 See Gilbreath & Watier, supra note 85, at 235 (citing the staying order, Leg-
end Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-99-00098-CV (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth Nov. 2, 1999)).
154 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 813 (holding that the court "will not substi-
tute our judgment on aviation-related issues for [the DOT's] reasonable one").
155 Id. at 788-89.
156 See id. at 806-07 (stating that ADA set an "extremely limited role" for pro-
prietary powers exceptions).
157 Id. (referring to the proprietary enforced perimeter restrictions in place at
New York's LaGuardia airport and Washington's National airport which were up-
held for their legitimate local need-a need the Fifth Circuit felt Fort Worth did
not show). For a detailed analysis of the law behind the Fifth Circuit's opinion,
see Gilbreath & Watler, supra note 85, at 235-50.
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ments. 58 With the Supreme Court denying certiorari 1'59 and the
Texas State Court of Appeals eventually reversing the trial
court's judgment, deferring to the DOT, 60 the Shelby Amend-
ment emerged through state and federal courts with a rather
broad interpretation.
An important consideration that precluded several airlines
from moving to Love Field was the Letter and Use Agreements
entered into by the airlines when DFW opened. 16' The court
held that "the use agreements are preempted as an impermissi-
ble attempt to regulate in an area where the federal government
has preempted state regulation. "162 As Continental was a party
to the agreements, it and all other airlines were relieved of any
contractual duty within the original Bond Ordinance
Agreements.'6
The court also upheld the DOT's interpretation that a fifty-six
seat configuration eliminates all restrictions, including through-
ticket advertising, of the Wright Amendment. 64 Relying on the
original DOT interpretation of the Shelby Amendment, Conti-
nental Express maintained a fifty-passenger seat Love Field to
Houston service during the litigation. 65 This connection to
Continental's hub and the removed advertising restriction led
the airline to announce service between Love Field and "the
world."'166 As Love Field was now open to an unlimited number
of destinations, airlines began to add various flights which were
previously banned through the original text of the Wright
Amendment. 67 Even with Wright in full force, Southwest, as
well as any other airline, has the ability to utilize the freedoms of
158 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 788-89.
159 City of Fort Worth v. Dep't of Transp., 530 U.S. 1274, 1274 (2000).
160 See Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83, 95 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, no pet.). For a thorough analysis of the differences held
by the federal and state courts see Gilbreath & Watler, supra note 85, at 250-57.
161 See City of Dallas v. Sw. Airlines Co., 371 F. Supp. 1015, 1020-21 (N.D. Tex.
1973). These agreements generally prohibited airlines from serving the Dallas
Love airport. Supra Part I.A.
162 See Am. Airlines, Inc., 202 F.3d at 811.
163 Id.
164 See Gilbreath & Watler, supra note 85, at 248.
165 Id. at 248-49.
166 Id.
167 American, Legend, Continental, and Delta Airlines all began serving desti-
nations outside the Love Field Service Area through the fifty-six-seat aircraft ex-
ception including Chicago, Los Angeles, Atlanta, Las Vegas, Washington, D.C.,
and Cleveland. Dallas Love Field, Love Notes: Chronology of Events, http://
www.dallas-lovefield.com/lovenotes/lovechrono.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
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the generous DOT interpretation. However, Southwest chose to
remain inside the original Love Field Service Area. 6 ' Much to
the disappointment of the state lawmakers who expanded the
states within the Love Field Service Area, a Southwest Dallas-
Love service was never added to the three states amended by the
Shelby Amendment."' 9 For over twenty years after its passage
and through its interpretations, Southwest Airlines remained
neutral and, at times, supportive of the Wright Amendment
compromise."'
D. SOUTHWEST COMES OUT AGAINST THE LOvE FIELD
RESTRICTIONS
Despite Southwest's long neutrality, on November 12, 2004,
Gary Kelly, Chief Executive Officer of Southwest Airlines, offi-
cially came out against the Wright Amendment and called for its
repeal. 171 Within hours of the announcement, dissent spread
among the community, including the city of Dallas-owner of
Love Field.172 Despite the opposition, Southwest launched a full
campaign to encourage Congress to repeal the Wright Amend-
ment. 173 In an effort to increase the stakes, Southwest later
threatened that if the Wright Amendment remained, the airline
might move its headquarters to another location. 174 After a year
of lobbying, Southwest eventually obtained a hearing in the Sen-
ate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.17 5
With testimony from Southwest, American Airlines, DFW Air-
port, and cities surrounding the area, Congress eventually ad-
ded an amendment attached to "Transportation Appropriations
-6 See, e.g., Sw. Airlines Co., Southwest Airlines, http://www.southwest.com
(last visited Oct. 30, 2007) (showing, from Dallas, only the Love Field Service
Area destinations available to Southwest through the Wright Amendment).
169 See Sudeep Reddy, Congress Puts Dent in Wright, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
19, 2005, at 2A.
170 See FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 7, at 26 (quoting Kelleher's stance on
the Wright Amendment as "passionately neutral").
'71 Eric Torbenson et al., Southwest Calling for Repeal of Wright: Airline's Chief
Ends Neutrality, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 13, 2004, at IA.
172 Id. at 15A (reporting adversarial responses from DFW Airport, Fort Worth,
and the Dallas mayor).
173 See, e.g., Repeal the Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, supra note 1.
174 See Eric Torbenson & Suzanne Marta Southwest Renews Talk of Relocation,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 19, 2006, at ID.
175 See S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., Wright Amendment Aviation
Hearing, http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id= 1653 (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2007).
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Bill." 176 Within the committee, Missouri Senator Kit Bond origi-
nally pushed for through-ticketing to states which lie outside the
Love Field Service Area, but in a less devastating result to the
Wright Amendment, Congress opted for his state, Missouri, to
be added to the Love Field Service Area. 7 7 Soon after the new
amendment went into law, Southwest began service to St. Louis
and Kansas City, Missouri.1 78 In an effort to remain competitive,
American Airlines opened new ticket counters and gates in Love
Field and cancelled service to less profitable routes at DFW. 1 7 1
Despite the new addition, Southwest continued to pledge "full
repeal of the Wright law" through its campaign.' 80
E. THE END OF AN ERA OR THE START OF SOMETHING NEW
On June 15, 2006, Dallas, Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines,
American Airlines, and DFW International Airport released a
joint statement 181 in an effort to ultimately resolve the dispute
over Love Field airport.18 2 The agreement sought an act by
Congress consistent with its terms. 8 The parties wanted imme-
diate through-ticketing ability to destinations within the United
States. More importantly, the statement requested the elimina-
tion of all "remaining restrictions on service from [Dallas Love]
after eight years from the enactment of legislation" with, of
course, a few exceptions.184 The restrictions requested included
a prohibition on through-ticketing out of Love Field to any in-
176 See Todd Gillman, American, Southwest Square Off Over Wright in D.C.: Senators
Hear Kelleher, Arpey Make Flight-or-Flight Arguments, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
11, 2005, at IA; Transp., Treasure, Housing and Urban Development, The Judici-
ary, The District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 181, 119 Stat 2396, 2430 (2005) (stating "[t]he first sen-
tence of section 29(c) of the International Air Transportation Competition Act of
1979 (Public Law 96-192; 94 Stat. 48) is amended by inserting 'Missouri,' before
'and Texas.'"). See Wright Amendment Aviation Hearing, supra note 175 (listing
the parties testifying in the Congressional hearing).
177 Pub. L. No. 109-115, § 181, 119 Stat. 2396, 2430 (2005).
178 Eric Torbenson, American Unveils Love Schedule, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,




18] Sw. Airlines Co. et al.,Joint Statement Among the City of Dallas, the City of
Fort Worth, Southwest Airlines, American Airlines, and DFW International Air-
port to Resolve the Wright Amendment Issues, http://www.setlovefree.com/pdf/
agree.amendment.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) [hereinafter joint Statement].
182 See Repeal the Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, supra note 1.
183 Joint Statement, supra note 181, at 1.
184 Id.
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ternational destination, a reduction in gates allowed to operate
in conjunction with the Dallas Love Field Master Plan, and sev-
eral penalties on both American and Southwest if air service was
attempted at other area airports outside of DFW or Love
Field. 85 Concurrently, Herb Kelleher held a news conference
claiming the public was the only true winner in the com-
promises and urging Congress to adopt the agreement as
legislation.'8 6
Of course, not every party affected by changes to the Wright
Amendment was a party to the joint statement. Soon after the
agreement was released to the public, JetBlue Airways and other
carriers spoke out against the agreement.' 87 The main com-
plaint by other airlines was that the reduction of gates combined
with the guarantee to extend the leases held by American, Con-
tinental, and Southwest, effectively shut out any other airline
from serving Love Field.188 Also upset were area communities
185 Id. at 1-3.
186 Repeal the Restrictions on Dallas Love Field, supra note 1. Kelleher stated:
I have been involved in litigation, legislative struggles, and cuss
fights over Love Field since 1972-a period of 34 years. The fact
that Southwest Airlines stands here today-stands here with Fort
Worth, DFW Airport, American Airlines, and the City of Dallas indi-
cates, I believe, that there must be hope for world peace. And
peace-and good will-is the essence of our agreement-not to
mention certainty, stability, and tranquility. Under the perseverant
Leadership of the Mayors of Dallas and Fort Worth-who have lit-
erally worked day and night to bring this "Peace Pact" into being,
our swords are truly being turned into plowshares. As with any dif-
ficult and complicated transaction, all sides, all parties, have been
compelled to make sacrifices-to yield on firmly held positions-to
moan and groan and agonize over decisions and mutual conces-
sions. The only victor-the only sure fire winner-from this agree-
ment-is the public-the public citizen who will find it easier and
far less expensive to travel to and from North Texas for business
and personal reasons-the citizens who will reap vast economic
benefits in their communities from enhanced travel and tourism-
at a lower cost. On behalf of the public, we stand shoulder to
shoulder with American Airlines, DFW Airport, and with the May-
ors of Dallas and Fort Worth, in urging the City Councils of Dallas
and Fort Worth-and in urging the U.S. Congress-to speedily ap-
prove the implementation of our agreement. Peace-truly endur-
ing peace-be with all of you-and with all of us.
Id.
187 See Sudeep Reddy & Robert Dodge, JetBlue Urges FAA to Block Wright Deal,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 20, 2006, at 2D.
188 Id. (stating that in a letter to key leaders in the House and Senate, JetBlue
founder and chief executive David Neeleman called the proposal "an anticompe-
titive and discriminatory arrangement that protects two carriers by permanently
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concerned with the effect on airports with the eighty-mile re-
striction189 contained in the proposal. 9 ° Fuel was added to the
fire when a leaked memorandum from the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment's Antitrust Division made its way into the newspapers. The
memo indicated that the twenty-gate cap would prevent airlines
from operating at Love Field and that airfares would not receive
the expected cost breaks from the removal of the Wright
Amendment. 9 '
However, on September 29, 2006, Congress passed the Wright
Amendment Reform Act of 2006 and President George W. Bush
then signed the bill on October 13, 2006.192 Section two of the
Wright Amendment Reform Act repeals the Wright Amend-
ment after an eight-year waiting period and immediately pro-
vides for through-ticketing to any destination, foreign or
domestic, from Love Field. 193 The main text in the sections that
follow contain a prohibition on nonstop international service
from Love Field, a reduction of the gates at Love Field to twenty,
and a significant amount of language likely aimed at thwarting
any antitrust lawsuits. 194 What will remain of Wright may de-
pend on the new variety of litigation attacking yet another ver-
sion of restrictions on Love Field.
V. THE WRIGHT POLICY
While slated for repeal, the Wright Amendment has proven
itself to be a formidable opponent in the court system.
excluding all competitors."); see also Sudeep Reddy, Hearing Won't Include JetBlue:
Foe of Wright Accord Can Submit Written Arguments to Panel, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 6, 2006, at 2D.
'89 See Joint Statement, supra note 181, at 3. The Joint Agreement precludes
American or Southwest Airlines from beginning service at any other airport
within 80-miles of Love Field. It also includes language which suggests the parties
will work jointly to encourage flights into DFW International. Id. at 1.
190 See Robert Dodge & Sudeep Reddy, Tweaks Made to Love Accord: Some
Lawmakers Fear Plan Hurts McKinney, Other Airports, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July
13, 2006, at IA.
'9' See Robert Dodge & Sudeep Reddy, Wright Deal Raises Antitrust Questions Jus-
tice Memo, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2006, at IA; see also S. 3661, 109th
Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).
192 See Sudeep Reddy, Congress Repeals Wright; Many Praise Legislation; Legal Chal-
lenges Could Still Be in Wings, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 30, 2006, at IA.
193 Wright Amendment Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-352, 120 Stat.
2011 (codified as amending section 29 of the International Air Transportation
Completion Act of 1979).
194 Id.
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A. COMMERCE CLAUSE
Since the inception of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has
been charged with regulating commerce "among the several
States. 19 5 The Supreme Court has defined that Commerce
Clause as having broad powers to regulate interstate com-
merce. 9 6 Congress continues to hold great power over the air-
line industry through this Commerce Clause. In 1978, when
Congress enacted the ADA, it later carved out an exception for
Dallas Love Field Airport in reaction to what it saw as a poten-
tially unjust situation for the cities of Dallas and Fort Worth.9 7
Withstanding many legal attacks, this exception, the Wright
Amendment, remains an area of law where Congress has great
deference to regulate.
B. THE WRIGHT AMENDMENT WILL REMAIN STRONG LAW
IF ALLOWED
1. Constitutional Issues
Repealing the Wright Amendment restrictions on constitu-
tional grounds will likely remain fruitless. Courts have consist-
ently rejected arguments that the Wright Amendment violates
the right to interstate travel.' As the Fifth Circuit noted, "If
every infringement on interstate travel violates the traveler's fun-
damental constitutional rights, any governmental act that limits
the ability to travel interstate, such as placing a traffic light
before an interstate bridge, would raise a constitutional is-
sue." '199 In a similar attack on the Wright Amendment, the
United States District Court claimed that "Congress imposed the
Wright Amendment for rational reasons," further elaborating
that "It]here is no constitutional right to the most convenient
form of transportation." 20 The same court also rejected an at-
tack on First Amendment rights to receive commercial informa-
tion through the advertisement ban of the Wright
195 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
196 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (identifying three
broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the commerce
clause power).
197 See Allen, supra note 60, at 1018-19.
198 See Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1031 (5th Cir. 1991); see also Kansas v.
United States, 797 F. Supp 1042, 1052 (D.C. 1992).
199 Cramer, 931 F.2d at 1031.
200 Kansas, 797 F. Supp. at 1052.
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Amendment.20 Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the
restriction at Love Field because this type of regulation is the
exact realm of control which should be held by Congress.20
2
The Constitution grants broad congressional commerce powers
that were used in the 1979 Wright Amendment to resolve an
inequity created by the ADA.203 Any destruction of this law
would create the same inequitable result which was alleviated in
1979.
2. Deference to Administrative Agency Interpretation
With the Amendment in firm constitutional standing, oppo-
nents turned to attack the interpretation of the Wright and
Shelby Amendment language. In 1998, when the DOT issued its
findings in the Love Field Service Interpretation Proceeding,
courts deferred to the interpretation of the DOT.20 4 Deference
is consistently given to the DOT in its reasonable interpretations
on the restrictions of Love Field through a Chevron analysis.2 °5
The Chevron case states that when the intent of a congressional
statute is not clear, courts will defer to the reasonable interpreta-
tion of the agency charged with interpreting it.2°6 As the DOT is
the "superintending agency" in the administration of the ADA
and is also the agency over aviation laws in general, DOT inter-
pretations of aviation laws will receive significant deference
through Chevron.20 7 The DOT is well connected to the industrial
ramifications of aviation law changes. Thus, the Wright Amend-
ment is likely in more capable hands when compared to court
interpretation.20 8 Using this deference, current DOT interpre-
tations of the restrictions at Love Field will likely continue to be
upheld by any future court challenge.
201 See id. at 1054 (holding that "the Wright Amendment's restrictions on com-
mercial speech do not impermissibly abridge the First Amendment").
202 See supra Part LV.A.
203 Id.
204 See, e.g. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 202 F.3d 788, 813 (5th Cir.
2000); Legend Airlines, Inc. v. City of Fort Worth, 23 S.W.3d 83, 96-97 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
205 Id.
206 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984) (holding "a court may not substitute its own constriction of a stat-
utory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administration of an
agency").
207 Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 805.
208 See Am. Airlines, 202 F.3d at 813 (stating that interpretations of aviation law
are within the expertise of the DOT and the court "will not substitute our judg-
ment on aviation-related issues for [the DOT's] reasonable one").
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C. COSTLY Low FAR-Es
Gaining wide consumer support for an action which would
make some air travel cheaper is a simple task. It is likely no
surprise that Southwest Airlines' business model allows it to en-
joy operating costs less than that of non-low-cost carriers. 20 9
Southwest can operate the same route as any other major air-
line, charge the same fare, use the same aircraft, and consist-
ently turn a profit higher than that of a major full service
airline. 210 There is no question that if the Wright Amendment is
repealed, and Southwest Airlines expands its service to the areas
outside of the Shelby and Wright Amendments, it will be able to
offer fares lower than that of competing airlines currently oper-
ating those routes from Dallas-Fort Worth Airport.211 South-
west's campaign touts a phenomenon called the "Southwest
Effect," which originated from a 1993 DOT study on Southwest's
effect on air fare.212 Southwest uses this DOT finding to show
an increase in passenger traffic due to the low fares the airline
brings when it begins new service, creating a feeling as the peo-
ple's airline.21 3 What Southwest neglects to mention are the
many negative findings behind the 1993 "Southwest Effect"
study acknowledged by the DOT.214 The DOT notes that while
many consumers enjoy the low prices of Southwest, the margins
erode the ability for existing airlines to compete. 21 5 The DOT
feels that without that competition, "[o]ver time, Southwest's
fares will increase to cover cost inefficiencies that will creep in,
and to extract monopoly profits. '216 The Department noted
that Southwest's prices increased where it forced out its compe-
209 DennisJ. Keithly, Comment, To Trap the White Tiger and Unicorn, The Govern-
ment Needs Better Traps: An Examination of the Viability of Predatory Pricing Claims in
the Airline Industry, 69J. AIR L. & CoM. 837, 848-51 (2004); see generally FREIBERG &
FREIBERG, supra note 7 (discussing the many ways Southwest shaves costs to main-
tain an efficient product).
210 Keithly, supra note 209, at 848-57 (stating that "[a]s a low cost carrier that
offers few amenities, Southwest does not need to fill as many seats at a compara-
ble price to that of a major airline, such as United, in order to turn a profit").
211 RANDALL D. BENNETT ET AL., OFFICE OF AvIATION, DEP'T OF TRANSP., AIRLINE
DEREGULATION CONTINUES: THE SOUTHWEST EFFECT 3 (1993), available at http://
ostpxweb.dot.gov/aviation/X-50%2ORole-files/Southwest%20Effect.DOC.
212 See Sw. Airlines Co., The Southwest Effect and the Wright Amendment,
http://www.setlovefree.com/southwesteffect.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
213 Id.
214 BENNETT ET AL., supra note 211, at 8-9.
215 Id. at 7.
216 Id_ at 9.
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tition.217 The "Southwest Effect" essentially drives out market
competition, thus reducing the service options available to con-
sumers on the whole. 2"8 Not only do consumer choices dwindle,
but the airport and city hosting the airline become prey. South-
west currently enjoys a highly reduced landing fee at Love Field
while the average fee of a comparable airport is 480 percent
more expensive. 219 Because of Southwest's domination of the
airport, the airline holds the airport hostage with below market
rates to help pay for facilities and maintenance. 220 The "South-
west Effect" bears a striking resemblance to what is similarly
coined "The Wal-Mart Phenomenon. 22 1 Southwest's attempts
to overturn Wright by concentrating consumer focus on the low
fares is similar in that:
Wal-Mart has also lulled shoppers into ignoring the difference
between the price of something and the cost. Its unending focus
on price underscores something that Americans are only starting
to realize about globalization: Ever-cheaper prices have conse-
quences ... We want clean air, clear water, good living condi-
tions, the best health care in the world-yet we aren't willing to
pay for anything manufactured under those restrictions. 222
Similarly, Southwest's low fares have a cost far higher than the
price. The Dallas Morning News reported that the new addition
of Missouri to the Wright Amendment could eliminate flights
between DFW and some small cities as well as overseas destina-
tions. 2 2 3 True to predictions, American Airlines was forced to
discontinue service to six destinations to begin a two-airport ser-
vice. 2 24 Lima, Peru was among the cities eliminated. 225 Reduced
services hit seven other cities, including several rural Texas cities
217 Id.
218 Id. at 7.
219 See Katie Fairbank & Tanya Eiserer, Love Field Fee Increase Is Proposed, DALLAs
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 10, 2006, at IB (reporting the current fee as 35 cents per
1000 pounds while the comparable airport market is at $2.03/1000 pounds).
220 See generally id. (reporting Southwest's Vice President, Ron Ricks as pro-
testing any increase higher than 20 cents, still far below the market rate).
221 See generally e.g., KENNETH E. STONE, IMPACT OF THE WAL-MART PHENOMENON
ON RURAL COMMUNITIES available at http://www.seta.iastate.edu/retail/publica-
tions/10_yr-study.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
222 Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart You Don't Know, FAST COMPANY, Dec. 2003,
at 68.
223 Reddy, supra note 169, at 2A.
224 See Torbenson, supra note 178.
225 Id.
459
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AN COMMERCE
like Tyler.226 Cheap flights to Missouri arrived at the cost of six
destinations choices for Dallas. 227 Full dissolution of the Wright
Amendment will lower fares, but it has the potential to stifle ru-
ral city economies and cut Texans from service to destinations
throughout the world. 228
While market-participant-dictated-competition is a staple of
the United States' economy, efforts to gain monopolistic advan-
tages are traditionally frowned upon. Southwest correctly con-
tends that, if repealed, the Wright Amendment's absence will
lead to more competition in the Dallas market and lower
fares. 229 However, Southwest Airlines has an obvious location
advantage in the Dallas area. Dallas-Fort Worth Airport is lo-
cated seventeen miles from downtown Dallas, while Love Field is
only six miles from the city. 230 Southwest states that its reason
behind its newfound disdain for Wright comes from the decline
of the short-haul market since the economic decline of Septem-
ber 11, 2001.231 However, Southwest has always had the option
of locating at Dallas-Fort Worth and operating a long-haul ser-
vice.212  The Dallas-Fort Worth Airport Board approached
Southwest Airlines several times after Delta Airlines departed in
order to negotiate a deal to take over the empty gates.2  Al-
though the DFW Board reported successful talks with Southwest,
the airline surprised the Board by pushing for the repeal of the
restrictions on Love Field instead. 234 Southwest claimed that a
two-airport operation would disrupt their "lost-cost, efficient
model of business" and require the reduction of their Love Field
service .235 Further, Southwest claims that DFW is too congested
226 Id.; see also Gillman, supra note 6, at D2 (reporting on the "dozens" of rural
cities who appeared before Congress to urge Congress to uphold Wright).
227 Torbenson, supra note 178.
228 See, e.g., Gillman, supra note 176, at IA (exposing rural city concerns of
long-haul flights from Love which would "hurt their economies and cut off re-
gions from air service"); see ECLAT CONSULTING, supra note 7, at 53 (indicating the
impact that would occur from an open Dallas Love Airport).
229 See Sw. Airlines Co., The Wright Amendment, http://www.setlovefree.com/
pdf/Wright4page.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2007) (showing a condensed example
of the argument Southwest Airlines uses to repeal the Wright Amendment).
230 See Allen, supra note 60, at 1062.
231 Sw. Airlines Co., Economic Impact of Repealing the Wright Amendment,
http://www.setlovefree.com/caseforrepeal.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
232 See Statement of Kevin Cox, supra note 109, at 14-15.
233 Id.
234 See Eric Torbenson, Drawing a Line in the Tarmac: Southwest's Big Reason for
Avoiding DFW? American, DALLAs MORNING NEWS, June 9, 2005, at ID.
235 Reddy & Dodge, supra note 187, at 2D.
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and that it is a "fortress hub. ' 236 What remains strange is that
these same obstacles do not hinder Southwest's operation in
other cities. Southwest flies out of seven of the country's most
congested airports, all with average delays longer than those at
DFW.23 7 In addition, Southwest conducts split airport opera-
tions in many other cities.238 If Southwest is determined to have
a single operation at Love Field, a more equitable solution
would be for Southwest to fly outside the Love Service Area
within the exceptions of the Wright and Shelby Amendment by
utilizing the fifty-six seat exception.239 No federal law needs to
be changed to meet Southwest's new-found expansive business
plan for Love Field. What prevents Southwest from a DFW oper-
ation is the chance to obtain national service without the pest of
competition in an airport that has a ninety-six percent 240 share
of the market.241
Consequently, each chip away from the Wright Amendment
will detract from the original purpose of its enactment. Deregu-
lation of the airline industry opened the door to competition,
but much evidence exists that it likely did more to destroy com-
petition.242 Congress carved out Love Field from the ADA, and
because Congress felt deregulation was apropos for every other
airport in America, a need to restrict Love Field airport likely
existed outside of free market ideals of deregulation. The
Wright Amendment respected the policy of the DOT's predeces-
sor when it directed the cities of Fort Worth and Dallas to unify
their airport in 1968. Congress saw an inequity within the new
deregulation rules and preserved an airport that would likely be
236 See Torbeson, supra note 234, at 10.
237 See Statement of Kevin Cox, supra note 109, at 14.
238 Id.
239 See Statement of Kevin Cox, supra note 109, at 12. Southwest could recon-
figure its 737s to a 56 passenger capacity or purchase compliable regional jets
which currently operate out of Love Field through the restriction it has refused
to use. Id.
240 Eric Torbenson, Love's Financial State Disputed, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec.
19, 2005, at ID.
241 See Statement of Kevin Cox, supra note 109, at 11 (elaborating that no other
major airport in the U.S. has such airline domination); see also id. at 22 (citing a
study by Professor Bijan Vasigh at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University as con-
cluding that "Southwest's fortress strategy in repealing the Wright Amendment is
not about a more competitive market and lower prices, but rather it is about the
concentration of its monopoly power at Dallas Love Field").
242 See generally GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPAcT OF
DEREGULATION (1993) (reviewing the subject of airline deregulation and the un-
derestimation of those who did not predict the consequences).
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closed today had Southwest not wedged an exception through
aggressive litigation. Love Field should be among the list of
other airports which were abandoned for new sites. 243 However,
the law is not always perfect, and when the court system fails,
our Constitution provides a system of checks and balances to
arrive at an equitable solution. Congress patched the hole that
Southwest Airlines created when it refused to move from Love
Field. It was a solution that allowed airlines, who invested in the
cities of Dallas and Fort Worth by moving to an airport that
could handle that level of traffic, to operate without the threat
of a single airline that used a loophole to get a competitive busi-
ness edge. That policy has not changed, and Southwest should
not have attempted to destroy a law when there are equitable
options available which would allow it to compete in the Dallas
long-haul market.
V. CONCLUSION
Southwest had options, but it chose to take the path which
would provide the airline with the largest competitive edge at
243 See Statement of Kevin Cox, supra note 109, at 24-25. Mr. Cox elaborates
on the following examples:
In virtually every case where a new airport has been built in recent
history, the older, existing airport in the community has been ei-
ther closed completely or has been permanently limited to general
aviation. Examples include Alexandria, Louisiana; Cleveland,
Ohio; Detroit, Michigan; Fort Myers, Florida; Kansas City, Missouri;
Killeen, Texas; Minneapolis/St. Paul, Minnesota; Northwest Arkan-
sas; and Seattle-Tacoma, Washington, just to name a few.
The two most recent examples, however, are the most compelling.
On the day that the new Denver International Airport was open for
service, Stapleton, the older inner-city airport, was closed perma-
nently to all operations. Today, the Stapleton area serves as a shin-
ing example of redevelopment that is to be envied across the
country.
The last major airport to be built was in Austin, Texas. In that case,
Robert Mueller Municipal Airport, an older inner-city airport, was
also closed completely. At the time, many of the airlines that
served Robert Mueller Municipal Airport refused to move to the
new airport until there was a contractual commitment on the part
of the City of Austin that Robert Mueller Municipal Airport would
never again be opened for commercial air service. Southwest Air-
lines was one of those airlines that benefited from the closure of
Robert Mueller Municipal Airport. It, like the other airlines, did
not want the older inner-city airport to be reopened at a lower cost
structure when all the other airlines had moved and were commit-
ted to the financial viability of Austin's new airport.
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the expense of public policy. Wright does affect the conve-
nience of travelers who live in the Dallas area, but what the aver-
age traveler may not consider is the aggregate consumer loss
that comes with low fares close to home. North Texas loses a
unified airport that can serve two cities effectively. Southwest
made a choice to remain at Love Field since it began service,
and in turn, Congress acted in a way which protects the airline
service available in North Texas. This protection has consist-
ently been held constitutional and is settled law, according to
many courts, until Congress deems otherwise. Policy implica-
tions are the only viable tools to sway congressional opinion.
The long history leading up to the passage of the Wright
Amendment showed that the unique situation in the Dallas area
could only be rectified with federal intervention. The Wright
Amendment was contrary to federal policy to deregulate the in-
dustry, but the inequitable situation was so exceptional that
Congress carved out a guideline to prevent an unjust market
anomaly. Airlines should compete, and the government should
do everything in its power to ensure that the competition is fair
and on level grounds. Travel is an essential key to the economy
and firmly within the area governed by the Commerce Clause of
the Constitution. The Pandora's Box of market realignment
which would occur from the congressional repeal would put an
unjust strain on an already ailing airline industry at the sole ben-
efit of one of the market's most profitable airlines. Southwest
touts a hampered desire to compete in the market, but the fair
market is open. It is open at the venue to which Southwest ref-
uses to transfer-DFW. The airline chose not to compete, but
rather to garner a ninety-six percent share of the Dallas market
at an airport where no other airline could legally operate. With
the many financial incentives offered to a Southwest-DFW opera-
tion, the cry of unfairness is a classic case of a free bird singing
the song of the caged.
463
OD
CA
ILAS. it*
